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Cognition can influence choices by modulation of decision-making processes. This
cognitive regulation is defined as processing information, applying knowledge, and
changing preferences to consciously modulate decisions. While cognitive regulation of
emotions has been extensively studied in psychiatry, few works have detailed cognitive
regulation of decision-making. Stress may influence emotional behavior, cognition, and
decision-making. In addition, the brain regions responsible for decision-making are
sensitive to stress-induced changes. Thus, we hypothesize that chronic stress may
disrupt the ability to regulate choices. Herein, we used a functional magnetic resonance
imaging task where fourteen control and fifteen chronically stressed students had to
cognitively upregulate or downregulate their craving before placing a bid to obtain food.
We found that stressed participants placed lower bids to get the reward and chose less
frequently higher bid values for food. Nevertheless, we did not find neural and behavioral
differences during cognitive regulation of craving. Our outcomes revealed that chronic
stress impacts decision-making after cognitive regulation of craving by reducing the
valuation of food rewards but not cognitive modulation itself. Importantly, our results
need further validation with larger sample sizes.
Keywords: stress, decision-making, cognition, magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI, reward, human, food
INTRODUCTION
Value-based decision-making is the ability to make a choice from competing courses of
action/alternatives based on subjective values and possible outcomes attributed to them (Balleine,
2005). This process is carried out whenever a person chooses from different alternatives (e.g.,
choosing between eating an apple or an orange, or between going out or not). Different interacting
systems are responsible for the valuation and action selection processes in the brain (Rangel et al.,
2008). First, a valuation system computes the action values. A comparator system needs to evaluate
the action values. An accumulator system receives and accumulates the value signals from the
Abbreviations: ACTH, adrenocorticotropic hormone; BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory
II; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; GLM, general linear model; MNI,
Montreal Neurological Institute; PSS-10, 10-items Perceived Stress Scale; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
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comparator system until the signal for one of the actions is
sufficiently strong for the choice to be executed (Gold and
Shadlen, 2007; Basten et al., 2010).
Values assigned to actions during the valuation process can
be influenced by different factors such as the degree of risk
or uncertainty of the action (Platt and Huettel, 2008; Rangel
et al., 2008). Humans have a natural aversion to risky or
uncertain choices and place less value on actions with temporal
uncertain rewards or multiple sets of outcomes (Christopoulos
et al., 2009; McGuire and Kable, 2012). Individuals often place
higher values on immediate rewards rather than on future
ones (Rangel et al., 2008). Social competition, cooperation, and
concerns for the well-being of others also influence decision-
making (Fehr and Camerer, 2007). Cognition can also influence
choices through modulation of the decision-making processes.
This cognitive regulation process may be defined as processing
information, applying knowledge and changing preferences to
consciously modulate our decisions. While cognitive regulation
of emotional response has been extensively studied (Ochsner
et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2008; Wager et al., 2008), few
works have detailed cognitive regulation of decision-making.
A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study where
participants had to modulate their cravings for food showed that
cognitive regulation affects decision-making through valuation
regulation and behavioral control (Hutcherson et al., 2012). The
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is known to compute
the value signal of decisions while the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (dlPFC) modulates this signal during cognitive regulation
tasks (Hare et al., 2009, 2011; Kober et al., 2010).
Cognitive regulation of both emotion and decision-making
has a role in the treatment of several conditions (schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, depression, obesity, addiction, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and eating disorders) where emotional
processing and decision-making are often impaired (Phillips
et al., 2003; Ochsner et al., 2004). On the other hand, mental
disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic
stress disorder, and depression are often associated with
prolonged exposure to stress (Arnsten, 2015; Sousa, 2016).
Stress impacts emotional processing leading to depressive and
anxious behavior associated with alterations in amygdala-
ventromedial-prefrontal pathways. Moreover, stress elicits
cognitive impairments namely working memory and attentional
deficits, poor decision-making (e.g., decreased reward sensitivity
or increased influence of immediate rewards), behavioral
inflexibility, and learning deficits. These cognitive differences are
associated with changes in prefrontal and hippocampal regions
(Sandi, 2013; Arnsten, 2015; Chen and Baram, 2016; Sousa,
2016). Additionally, the brain regions implicated in decision-
making processes are sensitive to stress-induced changes. In
fact, changes in fronto-striatal networks involved in behavioral
decisions have been reported in both humans and rodents after
chronic stress (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Soares et al., 2012;
Morgado et al., 2012, 2015a; Sousa, 2016; Magalhães et al., 2018).
Thus, stress seems to influence the quality of decisions (Starcke
and Brand, 2012; Morgado et al., 2015b; Bryce and Floresco,
2016; Chen and Baram, 2016) because cognitive control is
diminished (Yu, 2016).
Stress has also an impact on appetite and eating behavior
(Ans et al., 2018) and is one of the factors for development
of eating and obesity-associated conditions (Razzoli et al.,
2017). Usually, the production of adrenocorticotropic hormone
(ACTH) by the anterior pituitary gland leads to the release
of cortisol in the adrenal cortex to stimulate hunger and
feeding behavior. High cortisol levels are associated with high
insulin concentrations resulting in increased caloric intake or
food craving (Adam and Epel, 2007). Stress might boost these
pathways leading to an increase in food intake and appetite
for high-caloric food, or also reduced reward sensitivity to low-
caloric food (Razzoli et al., 2017; Ans et al., 2018; Berg Schmidt
et al., 2018; Ferrer-Cascales et al., 2018), in agreement with
previous stress decision-making studies demonstrating decreased
reward sensitivity or increased influence of immediate rewards
(Morgado et al., 2015b). Thus, stress seems to be associated
with increased food reward sensitivity due to diminished self-
control during food choice associated with decreased functional
connectivity between the vmPFC and dlPFC (Neseliler et al.,
2017) and increased connectivity between the vmPFC and
subcortical regions (amygdala and striatum) (Tryon et al., 2013;
Maier et al., 2015).
Herein, we used an fMRI task to clarify the impact of chronic
stress on cognitive regulation of decisions. Our task consisted
of cognitively upregulating or downregulating craving before
placing a bid to obtain food. In addition to brain responses,
we analyzed behavioral parameters (food valuation score and
reaction time) associated with the task, and blood hormonal
changes after the task (insulin, cortisol, and glucose). Regarding
the previous findings, we hypothesize that chronic stress may
disrupt the ability of individuals to regulate their choices. We
expect that cognitive regulation deficits after chronic stress
manifest by changes in the prefrontal cortex (vmPFC and
dlPFC). Subsequently, these deficits lead to decision-making
impairments, namely increased reward sensitivity, underlying
brain response alterations in prefrontal and striatal regions.
Moreover, we expect that chronic stress participants present
augmented levels of insulin, glucose, and cortisol after the




We enrolled in this study medical students from the School
of Medicine of University of Minho, Portugal. All students
were healthy Caucasians, right-handed, and had a healthy body-
mass index. One group was under normal academic activities
[control group, n = 14; 9 females/5 males; median (range) 23.00
(3.00) years of age; education 17.00 (3.00) years] and the other
included subjects on the long period of preparation for the
medical licensing exam [chronic psychosocial stress condition;
stress group, n = 15; 10 females/5 males; 24.00 (3.00) years of
age; education 18.00 (0.00) years]. This work was conducted 1
to 3 months before the exam, but students usually start preparing
1 year before the exam. Subjects were eligible if they were at least
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18 years old, reported no history of psychiatric or neurological
conditions, traumatic brain lesion, or substance abuse, and were
not on any psychiatric medication. The groups were matched for
gender (chi-squared test χ2(1) = 0.02, p = 0.893) but not for age
(Mann–Whitney test U = 169.00, p = 0.004, effect size r = 0.56)
and education level (U = 210.00, p = 2.579 × 10−8, r = 0.93).
Ethics Statement
The study was performed in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki and was approved by Ethics Subcommittee for the
Life and Health Sciences of University of Minho, Portugal, and
by the Ethics Committee of the Hospital of Braga, Portugal. All
subjects were provided with written informed consent following
description of the study goals and procedures.
Sociodemographic and Psychological
Scales
Subjects filled a questionnaire to characterize gender, age,
educational level, handedness, and ethnic origin. Weight and
height were also measured to prevent the inclusion of participants
with an unhealthy body mass index. Subjects were assessed
with the 10-items Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10) (Cohen et al.,
1983; Morgado et al., 2013), the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI)
(Beck et al., 1988), and the Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-
II) (Beck et al., 1996). PSS-10 measures the extent to which
participants perceived their life as unpredictable, uncontrollable,
and overloaded during the previous month. The higher the
score, the greater the intensity of perceived stress. BAI measures
the severity of an individual’s anxiety during the previous
week. Scores lower than 8 indicate minimal anxiety. Scores
higher than 7, 15, and 25 indicate mild, moderate, and severe
anxiety, respectively. BDI-II measures the severity of depression
and can be used as a screening tool. Scores lower than 14
indicate minimal depression. Higher scores indicate more severe
depressive symptoms.
Blood Sampling and Analysis
Before the fMRI acquisition, samples of venous blood were
collected from all participants into a 5 mL potassium
ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid tube and a serum tube.
We repeated the collection immediately after the fMRI
acquisition. Pre-scan blood samples were used to measure
cortisol, glucose, insulin, and ACTH serum levels. In post-scan
samples, we repeated cortisol, glucose, and insulin serum
measurements (ACTH measurement was not repeated due
to technical constraints). The collection took place between
2 and 7 pm which assures small variation in cortisol levels
during this period (Minkley and Kirchner, 2012). ACTH
was measured based on solid-phase, two-site sequential
chemiluminescent immunometric assay, and insulin with
solid-phase, enzyme-labeled chemiluminescent immunometric
assay (IMMULITE 2000, Siemens AG, Germany). Cortisol
levels were assessed with competitive immunoassay based on
direct chemiluminescent (ADVIA Centaur and Centaur XP,
Siemens AG, Germany). Glucose was measured based on the
hexokinase-glucose-6-phosphate method (Dimension Vista,
Siemens AG, Germany). Standard procedures were applied
following the manufacturer instructions.
Statistical Analysis
Data related with psychological scales, laboratory values, and
behavioral parameters were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics
(version 24.0; IBM Corporation, United States). Kolmogorov–
Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk tests were used to assess for normality
in the distribution of data. Comparisons between groups were
carried out by parametric t-tests or repeated measures ANOVA
(F-test, with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons
for post hoc tests], or non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-tests.
Differences were considered statistically significant if p < 0.05.
Effect sizes were calculated for all statistically significant results.
fMRI Task
The task was adapted from Hutcherson et al. (2012). Subjects
were instructed to fast for at least 4 h before their arrival and
to eat a light meal before the fasting period to increase the
valuation of food pictures. We also informed that they would
remain in the laboratory for 30 min at the end of the experiment
to eat the food they obtained during the fMRI task. The task
consisted of two parts: a pre-scan rating task that provided us
with a measure of the baseline value for food, and an in-scan
bidding and regulation task that measured the food value under
the influence of regulation.
During the pre-scan rating task, subjects were shown 150
pictures of different snack food items (e.g., cake, chips, and
candy) and rated, at their own pace, how much they would like
to eat them using a four-point scale (1, “Don’t want it at all”; 4,
“Want it a lot”). Our set of pictures was adapted to the Portuguese
context of food.
Afterward, subjects received instructions for the in-scan
bidding and regulation task (Figure 1). The 150 snack food
pictures were shown again, separated into three trial conditions:
indulge, distance, and natural. Each type of trial appeared 50
times, randomly interspersed over the scanning run. On each
trial, before the food appeared, participants saw an abstract
black-and-white symbol indicating the trial type (cue, 2 s). On
indulge trials, subjects were instructed to try to increase their
craving for the snack using any strategy they needed to. During
distance trials, the instruction consisted on trying to decrease
their craving. On natural trials, they had to allow thoughts and
feelings to come naturally. Subjects had 4 s to look at the item
and engage in the craving cognitive regulation task (hereinafter
referred as cognitive regulation task). After the 4 s, subjects had
2 s to place a bid (0 €, 1 €, 2 €, or 3 €) for the right to eat that food
at the end of the experiment. They were asked to treat each trial
as if it were the only decision that counted. These bids allowed us
to measure values expressed in behavior at the time of choice.
At the end of the experiment, food was auctioned using
an adapted version of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction
(Becker et al., 1964; Plassmann et al., 2007). We gave 3 € to
each subject to spend during the auction over a maximum of
three trials. Snacks and snacks prices were randomly selected
by drawing a paper from a bag. The bids on those trials during
the fMRI task determined whether subjects got to eat that food.
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FIGURE 1 | Timing and structure of a trial from the functional magnetic resonance task. ITI, intertrial interval.
Consider b the bid made by the subject during the fMRI task.
During the auction, a random price a was drawn (0 €, 1 €, 2 €, and
3 € were chosen with equal probability). If b ≥ a, the participant
got the item and spend a. If b < a, the subject did not get the
item. The rules of the auction ensure the subjects’ best strategy
to bid their true value for each food. This was explained and
emphasized during the instruction period. For auction effects,
omissions resulted in a bid of 0 €.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Each participant was scanned on a clinical approved 1.5 T
Siemens Magnetom Avanto system (Siemens Medical Solutions,
Germany) using a 12-channel receive-only head array coil. For
the functional acquisition, a T2∗ weighted echo-planar imaging
acquisition was acquired: 38 interleaved axial slices, repetition
time 2750 ms, echo time 30 ms, field of view 224 mm × 224 mm,
flip angle 90◦, in-plane resolution 3.5 mm × 3.5 mm, slice
thickness 3.5 mm, and between-slice gap 0.5 mm. To optimize
the sensitivity in the orbitofrontal cortex, a tilted acquisition in
an oblique orientation of 30◦ relative to the anterior-posterior
commissure line was used. In total, 650 volumes were acquired
during the task. The task stimulus was presented using the
fully integrated fMRI system IFIS-SA (Invivo Corporation,
United States) and the same system was used to record the
subject key-press responses. One high-resolution T1-weighted
Magnetization-Prepared Rapid Acquisition with Gradient Echo
sequence, with 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm voxel size, repetition
time 2.73 s, echo time 3.48 ms, flip angle 7◦, field of view
234 mm × 234 mm, and 176 slices was acquired. This anatomical
sequence was used to project the functional maps.
fMRI Data Preprocessing
The functional scans from each participant were preprocessed
using the Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) version 12
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute
of Neurology, United Kingdom) using MATLAB version
R2018a (The MathWorks Inc.,United States). The preprocessing
procedures included: slice-timing correction using the first
slice as reference; realignment to the mean volume of
the acquisition; nonlinear spatial normalization to Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) standard space and resampling to
2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm voxel size; spatial smoothing with a 8 mm
full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel; high pass temporal
filtering at 128 s. Participants with more than 3 mm of movement
(1 voxel) were excluded (n = 0).
fMRI Data Analysis
For the first-level analysis, one general linear model (GLM) was
computed per participant. For this GLM, the regressors of interest
included: the type of cognitive regulation trial (1 – distance, 2 –
natural, and 3 – indulge) and the corresponding bid (4 – bids
after distance trials, 5 – bids after natural trials, and 6 – bids after
indulge trials). The bid regressors were parametrically modulated
by the bid value (0, 1, 2, and 3 €), the pre-rating score before
the task (1 to 4), and the reaction time. Additional regressors
included: 7 – the cue; 8 – the interstimulus interval; 9 – the
omission bids; 10 – 16 the motion parameters estimated during
the realignment step. The onset and duration of the regressors
were defined accordingly to the stimulus represented in Figure 1
with a boxcar function and the regressors were convolved with
the canonical hemodynamic response function.
At the group level (second-level analysis), a random-effects
analysis was performed using four different mixed-design
ANOVA models: (1) represented the cognitive regulation during
the task (enabled comparisons in average activation for each
regulation trial between and within groups); (2) concerned the
bidding/valuation during the task modulated by the bid value;
(3) concerned the bidding/valuation during the task modulated
by the pre-rating score; (4) concerned the bidding/valuation
during the task modulated by the reaction time. Models
(2) – (4) were used to test if food valuation was different
between groups after distinct regulation trials. For all models,
the group (stress vs. control) was introduced as the between-
subject factor and each trial during cognitive regulation (distance
vs. natural vs. indulge) as the within-subject factor. Age and
education were used as covariates for all models. All models
were implemented with the GLMFlex toolbox1 which uses
partitioned error terms for within-group and between-group
comparisons, enabling the estimation of all the effects of interest
with a single model.
Results were considered statistically significant after
correcting for multiple comparisons using cluster correction
1http://nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/harvardagingbrain/People/AaronSchultz/GLM_
Flex.html
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(minimum cluster size of 90 voxels). The minimum cluster
size was determined with 3DClustSim (AFNI version 17.0.13;
National Institute of Mental Health)2. This program determines
a minimum cluster size with Monte Carlo Simulation to achieve
a corrected significance of p < 0.05 with an initial voxel-wise
threshold of p < 0.001. The Automated Anatomical Labeling
plugin for SPM was used to classify the brain regions.
RESULTS
Psychological Assessment
The stress group revealed higher levels of perceived stress
(mean ± standard deviation 15.07 ± 5.23) than the control group
(8.64 ± 5.27) as assessed by PSS-10 [t(27) = 3.30, p = 0.003,
effect size d = 1.27]. No statistically significant differences were
found for BAI (U = 117.50, p = 0.591) and BDI-II (U = 134.00,
p = 0.217) between groups.
Blood Sampling
The ACTH levels before the fMRI session were similar between
the two groups (U = 81.50, p = 0.310).
Cortisol serum levels were not statistically significantly
different between groups [group F(1,27) = 0.45, p = 0.509] nor
within group before and after the fMRI session [group × time
F(1,27) = 1.00 × 10−3, p = 0.971]. However, cortisol levels
decreased in both groups after the task [time F(1,27) = 10.08,
p = 0.004, effect size χ2 = 0.27].
Glucose serum levels were not statistically significantly
different between groups [group F(1,27) = 0.40, p = 0.531]
and the pre and post-measurement were similar within groups
[group × time F(1,27) = 0.18, p = 0.672]. However, glucose levels
decreased in both groups after the task [time F(1,27) = 8.44,
p = 0.007, χ2 = 0.24].
Insulin serum levels were not statistically significantly
different between groups [group F(1,27) = 0.42, p = 0.522]
and the pre and post-measurement were similar within groups
[group × time F(1,27) = 3.68, p = 0.066]. However, insulin levels
decreased in both groups after the task [time F(1,27) = 9.21,
p = 0.005, χ2 = 0.25].
Behavioral Analysis
Given the differences in age and education between groups,
we used these variables as covariates when analyzing
behavioral parameters.
We analyzed the reaction time between and within groups
during the different regulation trials (distance, natural, and
indulge). We found an interaction effect between the group
and the reaction time across the different regulation conditions
[group × condition F(2,50) = 4.00, p = 0.024, χ2 = 0.14;
Table 1 represents the results for all between and within group
factors and covariate effects]. Post hoc tests with repeated
measures ANOVA demonstrated statistically significant reaction
time differences within the control group [F(1.42,18.43) = 7.06,
2https://afni.nimh.nih.gov/
p = 0.010, χ2 = 0.35, Greenhouse-Geisser correction for non-
sphericity] and within the stress group [F(1.34,18.82) = 4.72,
p = 0.033, χ2 = 0.25, Greenhouse-Geisser correction for
non-sphericity]. Paired t-tests with Bonferroni correction
showed that the reaction time for natural trials was shorter
than for distance [t(13) = 4.82, p = 0.001, d = 2.67] and
indulge trials [t(13) = 3.07, p = 0.027, d = 1.70], and
distance and indulge trials presented similar reaction times
[t(13) = 1.00, p = 1.000] in the control group. However,
we did not find significant statistical differences in the
stress group during post-hoc analysis [1.00 ≤ t(14) ≤ 2.36,
0.099 ≤ p ≤ 1.000] (Figure 2).
Taking into account that different instructions were given
during the pre-rating (how much the participants want the
food) and the bidding (how much the participants want to
pay for the food), we separately analyzed differences between
groups in the valuation score across the regulation conditions
(distance, natural, and indulge) for pre and post-regulation
scores (Table 1 represents the results for all between and
within group factors and covariate effects). During pre-rating,
we did not find statistically significant differences between
groups or within group in terms of food valuation across
the conditions. Moreover, the valuation score varied similarly
among the conditions for both groups. However, during bidding,
we found differences between groups [group F(1,25) = 6.91,
p = 0.014, χ2 = 0.22] but not within group in terms of
food valuation across the conditions. Moreover, the valuation
score varied similarly among the conditions for both groups.
The stress group had lower valuation scores (1.06 ± 0.36
€) during bidding in comparison to the control group
(1.50 ± 0.36 €) (Figure 3).
Moreover, we also studied differences between groups in
the number of responses for each bidding value after each
cognitive regulation trial inside the scanner. We found a
significant interaction effect between the group and the bid value
[group × valuation F(2.13,53.15) = 3.89, p = 0.024, χ2 = 0.13,
Greenhouse-Geisser correction for non-sphericity; Table 1
represents the results for all between and within group factors and
covariate effects]. Post hoc tests with repeated measures ANOVA
demonstrated that the control [F(3,39) = 9.61, p = 7.000 × 10−5,
χ2 = 0.42] and the stress group [F(2.03,28.43) = 9.04, p = 0.001,
χ2 = 0.39, Greenhouse-Geisser correction for non-sphericity]
had a different number of responses across the bid values. Paired
t-tests with Bonferroni correction demonstrated that on average
the stress participants bided more often 0 [t(14) = 3.93, p = 0.009,
d = 1.78] and 1 € [t(14) = 3.38, p = 0.027, d = 1.81] than 3 €,
while control subjects bided more times 1 [t(13) = 3.94, p = 0.010,
d = 2.18] and 2 € [t(13) = 5.91, p = 3.090 × 10−4, d = 3.28]
than 3 € (Figure 4).
Neuroimaging Results
We tested for differences in blood-oxygen-level-dependent
responses between stress and control groups during each
cognitive regulation period/trial (natural, indulge, and
distance) – model (1). No statistically significant brain regions
were identified for overall differences between groups (main
effect of group). When looking at the interaction effect between
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TABLE 1 | Results for statistical tests on behavioral variables associated with the functional magnetic resonance imaging task: reaction time, valuation score, and
response frequency.
Statistical effect Test value P-value Effect size χ2
Reaction time
Condition (distance, natural, and indulge) F(2,50) = 3.00 0.059
Group × condition F(2,50) = 4.00 0.024 0.14∗
Group F(1,25) = 0.02 0.886
Age F(1,25) = 1.36 × 10−4 0.991
Education F(1,25) = 0.40 0.535
Valuation score
Pre-rating score
Condition (distance, natural, and indulge) F(2,50) = 1.21 0.308
Group × condition F(2,50) = 0.85 0.433
Group F(1,25) = 0.32 0.574
Age F(1,25) = 0.03 0.873
Education F(1,25) = 0.12 0.728
Bid value
Condition (distance, natural, and indulge) F(1.32,33.03) = 0.57 0.502
Group × condition F(1.32,33.03) = 1.87 0.180
Group F(1,25) = 6.91 0.014 0.22∗
Age F(1,25) = 0.11 0.746
Education F(1,25) = 0.56 0.462
Response frequency
Condition (distance, natural, and indulge) F(1.16,29.0) = 0.02 0.912a
Group × condition F(1.16,29.0) = 0.03 0.895a
Valuation (0, 1, 2, and 3 €) F(2.13,53.15) = 1.30 0.283a
Group × valuation F(2.13,53.15) = 3.89 0.024a 0.13∗
Condition × valuation F(3.44,86.11) = 0.76 0.536a
Group × condition × valuation F(3.44,86.11) = 1.45 0.231a
Group F(1,25) = 0.27 0.605
Age F(1,25) = 0.20 0.655
Education F(1,25) = 0.11 0.747
∗Statistical significance; aGreenhouse-Geisser correction for non-sphericity.
trial condition and group, there were also no statistically
significant effects. Nonetheless, we found a main effect of
the cognitive regulation condition in the left hemisphere
in the superior (Brodmann area 22) and middle temporal
gyrus (Brodmann area 21), the rolandic operculum, and the
precentral gyrus (Brodmann area 6) [7.87 ≤ F(2,54) ≤ 13.97,
p ≤ 0.001, 99 voxels, Montreal Neurological Institute peak
voxel coordinates -60 -6 -4). Post hoc paired t-tests with
Bonferroni correction demonstrated that the distance and
indulge trials elicited lower activity than natural trials and
that distance trials lead to higher responses than indulge
trials in these regions [distance vs. natural t(28) = 2.97,
p = 0.018, d = 1.12; distance vs. indulge t(28) = 2.68, p = 0.036,
d = 1.01; natural vs. indulge t(28) = 4.97, p = 9 × 10−5,
d = 1.88] (Figure 5).
With the models (2) – (4), we tested if food valuation/bidding
behavior was associated with different brain activation between
groups after each regulation condition, with parametric
modulation by bid value (model 2), pre-rating score (model
3), and reaction time (model 4). No statistically significant
regions were identified for overall differences between groups
during bidding (main effect of group) for the models (2) – (4).
Additionally, no statistically significant active regions were found
for interaction effects of group and the bids after each category
of cognitive regulation (group × cognitive regulation condition),
and the main effect of the condition was also not statistically
significant for the models (2) – (4).
Task Validity
Given that our fMRI task was adapted from Hutcherson et al.
(2012), here we compared our main results with these authors’
significant findings to study the task validity. Since we observed
behavioral differences between the control and stress groups, we
assessed the validity of the task only with the control group.
As observed by Hutcherson et al. (2012), we also saw that
the control group took longer while bidding after distance
[t(13) = 4.82, p = 0.001, d = 2.67, with Bonferroni correction]
and indulge trials [t(13) = 3.07, p = 0.027, d = 1.70, with
Bonferroni correction] than natural trials [group × condition
F(1.42,18.43) = 7.06, p = 0.010, χ2 = 0.35, Greenhouse-Geisser
correction for non-sphericity] (Figure 2). Moreover, the distance
trials were also associated with the longest reaction time
(778.30 ± 198.70 ms), followed by indulge (744.38 ± 125.21 ms),
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FIGURE 2 | Representation of the reaction time for the different regulation
conditions (natural, distance, and indulge) for the stress and control group.
The reaction time for natural trials was shorter than for distance [t(13) = 4.82,
p = 0.001, d = 2.67] and indulge trials [t(13) = 3.07, p = 0.027, d = 1.70] in the
control group but no statistically significant differences occurred in the stress
group. The black star represents statistically significant differences. The main
bars represent the mean values and the error bars represent the standard
error.
and natural (652.98 ± 131.97 ms) trials. These reaction times
values are consistent with the previous study.
Concerning the bid value, similarly to Hutcherson
et al. (2012), we observed a main effect of the cognitive
regulation condition (distance, natural, and indulge) in controls
[F(1.23,16.05) = 16.88, p = 4.650 × 10−4, χ2 = 0.56, Greenhouse-
Geisser correction for non-sphericity]. The control participants
bided higher on indulge [1.74 ± 0.43 €; t(13) = 2.89, p = 0.038,
d = 1.60, with Bonferroni correction] and lower on distance
[1.04 ± 0.28 €; t(13) = 4.22, p = 0.003, d = 2.34, with Bonferroni
correction] compared to natural trials (1.50 ± 0.23 €). Bids after
distance and indulge trials were also statistically significantly
different [t(13) = 4.22, p = 0.003, d = 2.34, with Bonferroni
correction] (Figure 3). The bid values in our study (0, 1, 2, and 3
€) were distinct from the original study ($ 0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0,
and 2.5), thus we could not compare the average bid values after
each condition trial.
For neuroimaging data, we computed the contrasts among
the cognitive regulation trials in the control group to compare
our results with the original study: Distance > Natural,
Natural > Distance, Indulge > Natural, Natural > Indulge,
Distance > Indulge, and Indulge > Distance. We applied cluster
correction for multiple comparisons (90 voxels as described in
the section “Materials and Methods”). We found statistically
significant results only for the contrasts Distance > Natural
and Indulge > Natural. These results are in agreement with
Hutcherson et al. (2012)’s findings if the same minimum
cluster size is considered. For the contrast Distance > Natural,
similarly to the original work, we also found statistically
significant activation in temporal and posterior parietal regions
(Supplementary Table S1). However, results did not show
statistically significant activity in medial and ventrolateral
prefrontal regions. For the contrast Indulge > Natural, we
found statistically significant responses in the anterior cingulate
cortex, the ventral, medial, and superior prefrontal cortex,
temporal and parietal regions, and the supplementary motor area
(Supplementary Table S1). Thus, our results are concordant with
these authors’ previous findings.
DISCUSSION
We studied how chronic stress influences decision-making on
food valuation after cognitive regulation (increasing/indulge
or decreasing/distance food craving) in medical students.
Behavioral, biochemical and neuroimaging analysis were
performed to address this question. We found that stressed
participants present decreased food valuation scores. This result
was reinforced by a higher number of responses for the lowest
bid values for food in the stress group. The biochemical analysis
(serum levels of insulin, cortisol, and glucose) did not show
statistically significant differences between the control and
stress group. The neuroimaging results did not demonstrate
statistically significant differently activated brain regions between
the stressed and control participants during cognitive regulation
of craving and decision-making/bidding.
Although the acute stress response is generally beneficial, i.e.,
promotes adaptation to stressful stimulus, prolonged activation
of the stress response produces deleterious effects on the body
and brain, affecting cognitive processes such as decision-making
(Mcewen, 2004; McEwen and Gianaros, 2011; Sousa, 2016).
One of the main findings of the present study is that stressed
individuals presented lower scores during food valuation, in
contrast with our initial hypothesis. This may translate a blunted
hedonic capacity or reward sensitivity (Berenbaum and Connelly,
1993; Porcelli et al., 2012; Bryce and Floresco, 2016; Porcelli and
Delgado, 2017; Uy and Galván, 2017), as anhedonia has been
associated with higher perceived stress scale scores (Pizzagalli
et al., 2007) and stress causes changes in regions related to
hedonic/rewarding behavior such as the amygdala, orbitofrontal
cortex, vmPFC, and ventral and dorsal striatum (Gorwood, 2008;
Porcelli et al., 2012; Bessa et al., 2013; Stark et al., 2015). Moreover,
the distribution of the number of responses was higher for lower
bids in the stress group, i.e., stressed subjects seemed less prone to
place high bids for food. A previous work including a food-related
task discovered decreased reward sensitivity associated with
alterations in the putamen activity after acute stress induction
(Born et al., 2010). Another report pointed out that acute stress
does not potentiate craving after stimulation with food pictures
(Stojek et al., 2015). Moreover, animal research indicates that
acute stress reduces the motivation to work for food rewards
(Bryce and Floresco, 2016). Other studies have also shown
that acute and chronic stress mitigate brain responses to food
stimuli in reward pathways (Wierenga et al., 2018). These results
support the idea that stress participants have a reduced valuation
attributed to food rewards. However, other studies have shown
increased sensitivity to high-caloric food rewards in stressed
individuals (Razzoli et al., 2017; Ans et al., 2018; Berg Schmidt
et al., 2018; Ferrer-Cascales et al., 2018). Reward processing might
be different when participants are stimulated with food pictures
or real food. Moreover, the inclusion of chronic or acute stress
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FIGURE 3 | Representation of the normalized rating scores for food pictures for each trial condition (natural, distance, and indulge) before performing the functional
magnetic resonance task (before cognitive regulation) and during the functional magnetic resonance task (after cognitive regulation) for the stress and control groups
(the normalized scores represent the ratio between given score and maximum score). Before cognitive regulation, we did not find statistically significant differences
between groups or within group in terms of food valuation across the conditions. After cognitive regulation, the stress group had lower average valuation scores in
comparison to the control group [group F(1,25) = 6.91, p = 0.014, χ2 = 0.22]. The black star represents statistically significant differences. The main bars represent
the mean values and the error bars represent the standard error.
FIGURE 4 | Representation of the number of responses for the stress and control groups during bidding for each cognitive regulation trial and for the average of all
trials. On average, the stress participants bided more often 0 [t(14) = 3.93, p = 0.009, d = 1.78] and 1 € [t(14) = 3.38, p = 0.027, d = 1.81] than 3 €, while control
subjects bided more times 1 [t(13) = 3.94, p = 0.010, d = 2.18] and 2 € [t(13) = 5.91, p = 3.090 × 10−4, d = 3.28] than 3 €. The black star represents statistically
significant differences. The main bars represent the mean values and the error bars represent the standard error.
models might also account for different results regarding reward
sensitivity (Porcelli and Delgado, 2017). However, our results
need confirmation with larger sample sizes.
While bidding, the stressed subjects did not present
differential brain activity when compared to control subjects,
despite the behavioral differences in the valuation score. We were
expecting that poor cognitive self-control reflected in reduced
prefrontal activation (Hare et al., 2009, 2011; Kober et al., 2010;
Hutcherson et al., 2012) would lead to higher responses in
striatal and amygdalar regions associated with increased reward
sensitivity (Louis et al., 2009; Tryon et al., 2013; Maier et al., 2015;
Neseliler et al., 2017). Other studies have found controversial
results demonstrating that reduced striatal activity was associated
with high levels of stress and increased food craving (Hommer
et al., 2013). However, we did not observe cognitive differences
between the groups and reward sensitivity was decreased. Our
sample size may have limited the statistical power of this analysis.
Thus, further research should be conducted to understand the
neural correlates of decision-making after cognitive regulation
since our results are not conclusive.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 July 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 724
fnins-13-00724 July 10, 2019 Time: 13:55 # 9
Ferreira et al. Cognition Impact in Stress Decision-Making
FIGURE 5 | Statistically significant brain regions resulting from the main effect of the cognitive regulation condition (natural, indulge, and distance) for both groups
(cluster correction for multiple comparisons, minimum voxel size of 90, p < 0.001, F(2,54) value between 7.87 and 13.97 represented by the colored bar). The
distance and indulge trials elicited lower activity than natural trials, and the distance trials lead to higher responses than indulge trials in these regions (distance vs.
natural t(28) = 2.97, p = 0.018, d = 1.12; distance vs. indulge t(28) = 2.68, p = 0.036, d = 1.01; natural vs. indulge t(28) = 4.97, p = 9 × 10-5, d = 1.88). These
regions include the superior (Brodmann area 22) and middle temporal gyrus (Brodmann area 21), the rolandic operculum, and the precentral gyrus (Brodmann area
6). The numbers above the slices represent the Montreal Neurological Institute peak voxel coordinates. The black star represents statistically significant differences.
The main bars represent the mean values and the error bars represent the standard error. L, left; R, Right.
Our neuroimaging results did not show brain activity
differences between groups during cognitive regulation.
According to previous studies, the vmPFC and dlPFC are regions
responsible for cognitive regulation in this decision-making
context (Hare et al., 2009, 2011; Kober et al., 2010; Hutcherson
et al., 2012). Thus, the absence of changes in these regions
between groups in our work might indicate that the processes for
cognitive regulation of food craving are not affected by chronic
stress, or that our specific model of chronic stress might not
lead to changes in cognitive modulation of craving. However,
previous works revealed that cognitive control is diminished
under stress, leading to emotional and habitual-biased decision-
making (Yu, 2016), and increased reward sensitivity for food
(Tryon et al., 2013; Maier et al., 2015; Neseliler et al., 2017).
Our moderate sample size might have hindered putative
differences between groups. Nonetheless, as shown in Figures 2,
3, stressed participants were able to modulate their responses,
demonstrating an effective cognitive regulation, although the
average food bidding score was lower than in controls. Both
groups were capable of effectively using cognitive regulation
to change the value placed on food during regulated trials.
Moreover, both groups took longer times during bidding after
regulated trials. Indeed, we found that activity in the superior and
middle temporal gyrus, rolandic operculum, and precentral gyrus
was differently modulated by trials with cognitive regulation
of craving versus non-regulated trials in both groups. Previous
authors provided evidence for a functional connection between
the vmPFC and the precentral gyrus during food-related
decisions, and for the correlation between food ratings and the
response in the middle temporal gyrus (Kober et al., 2010; Hare
et al., 2011; Hutcherson et al., 2012). Moreover, the temporal
gyrus is also involved in food imagery (Hommer et al., 2013).
Thus, the regulatory success does not seem to be affected by
stress. During cognitive control tasks, attentional narrowing
might occur after stimulation with negative pictures with
threat and sadness-related content (van Steenbergen et al., 2011;
Melcher et al., 2012; Papazacharias et al., 2015). Thus, the
negative emotional state in the stress group (e.g., fear of falling
the final exam) might have led to higher attentional focus during
cognitive regulation that might compensate cognitive deficits
associated with chronic stress. Nonetheless, our results need
further validation with larger sample sizes to rule out a putative
effect of chronic stress in cognitive regulation of craving.
Insulin, cortisol, and glucose levels are expected to decrease
after fasting (Kirschbaum et al., 1997; Adam and Epel, 2007;
Figlewicz, 2015; Tiedemann et al., 2017). However, peripheral
concentrations of cortisol rise after stimulation with food images
due to appetite enhancement, while insulin and glucose levels
seem to be unaffected (Schmid et al., 2005; Schüssler et al., 2012;
Kroemer et al., 2013). In our study, both groups presented a
decreased in insulin, glucose, and cortisol levels after the fMRI
task. Thus, the effects of fasting might have potentially surpassed
the effects of stimulation with food pictures (Brede et al., 2017).
Nonetheless, this hypothesis needs further testing. We were
expecting increased craving in the stress group after a deficient
cognitive regulation and increased reward sensitivity to food
(Tryon et al., 2013; Maier et al., 2015; Neseliler et al., 2017).
However, our results agree with the fact that we found reduced
valuation of rewards in the absence of cognitive regulation
alterations in the stress group, suggesting that overall craving was
reduced. For controls, the instructions to differently modulate
craving might have led to balanced changes in blood parameters
after stimulation with food pictures. Thus, our results might
derive from fasting since they occurred in both groups.
Importantly, our results are limited by the sample size. These
results need to be replicated with larger samples to avoid false
negative and positive conclusions. Moreover, the results might
have been influenced by the unbalanced proportion of females
and males per group, given that gender differences were found
in decision-making under stress (Yu, 2016; Wemm and Wulfert,
2017). However, we focused on group differences and groups
were matched for gender ratio.
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Our results show that the capacity to perform cognitive
regulation of craving is not impaired after prolonged stress.
However, chronic stress reduces the value attributed to food
rewards after craving modulation. Importantly, our conclusions
are limited by the small sample size and need further validation
with larger samples. These findings are relevant to guide
subsequent studies on cognitive regulation of food-related
decision-making for eating and obesity-associated disorders.
Cognitive control techniques might be used to tackle decision-
making impairments in these conditions (Louis et al., 2009;
May et al., 2012).
DATA AVAILABILITY
The datasets generated for this study are available on request to
the corresponding author.
ETHICS STATEMENT
This study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki. All subjects gave written informed consent. The
protocol was approved by the Ethics Subcommittee for the Life
and Health Sciences of University of Minho, Portugal, and by the
Ethics Committee of the Hospital of Braga, Portugal.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
SF, CV, PM, RM, AC, PMore, and CP-N acquired, analyzed,
and interpreted the data and wrote the manuscript. NS and
PMorg supervised the work, interpreted the data, and wrote and
reviewed the manuscript. All authors participated in the design
of the experiments and approved the manuscript.
FUNDING
This work was funded by the MyHealth project (DoIT –
Desenvolvimento e Operacionalização da Investigação de
Translação, Contract DoIT-13853) and the BIAL Foundation,
Porto, Portugal (Grant No. PT/FB/BL-2016-206). This
work was also funded by the FEDER funds, through the
Competitiveness Factors Operational Programme (COMPETE),
and by national funds, through the Foundation for Science
and Technology (FCT), under the scope of the project
POCI-01-0145-FEDER-007038. This manuscript has been
developed under the scope of the project NORTE-01-0145-
FEDER-000013, supported by the Northern Portugal Regional
Operational Programme (NORTE 2020), under the Portugal
2020 Partnership Agreement, through the European Regional
Development Fund (FEDER). PaM was supported by a
fellowship of the project “SwitchBox” (Contract HEALTH-
F2-2010-259772). SF was supported by a combined Ph.D.
scholarship from the FCT and the company iCognitus4ALL –
IT Solutions, Lda (PD/BDE/127839/2016). RM was supported
by the combined FCT and Enlightenment, Lda fellowship
(PDE/BDE/113604/2015) from the PhDiHES program.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL




Adam, T. C., and Epel, E. S. (2007). Stress, eating and the reward system. Physiol.
Behav. 91, 449–458. doi: 10.1016/j.physbeh.2007.04.011
Ans, A. H., Anjum, I., Satija, V., Inayat, A., Asghar, Z., Akram, I., et al. (2018).
Neurohormonal regulation of appetite and its relationship with stress: a mini
literature review. Cureus 10:e3032. doi: 10.7759/cureus.3032
Arnsten, A. F. T. (2015). Stress weakens prefrontal networks: molecular
insults to higher cognition. Nat. Neurosci. 18, 1376–1385. doi: 10.1038/nn.
4087
Balleine, B. (2005). Neural bases of food-seeking: affect, arousal and reward
in corticostriatolimbic circuits?. Physiol. Behav. 86, 717–730. doi: 10.1016/j.
physbeh.2005.08.061
Basten, U., Biele, G., Heekeren, H. R., and Fiebach, C. J. (2010). How the brain
integrates costs and benefits during decision making. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 107, 21767–21772. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0908104107
Beck, A. T., Epstein, N., Brown, G., and Steer, R. A. (1988). An inventory for
measuring clinical anxiety: psychometric properties. J. Consult. Clin. Psychol.
56, 893–897. doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.56.6.893
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., Ball, R., and Ranieri, W. (1996). Comparison of beck
depression inventories -IA and -II in psychiatric outpatients. J. Pers. Assess. 67,
588–597. doi: 10.1207/s15327752jpa6703_13
Becker, G. M., Degroot, M. H., and Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by
a single-response sequential method. Behav. Sci. 9, 226–232. doi: 10.1002/bs.
3830090304
Berenbaum, H., and Connelly, J. (1993). The effect of stress on hedonic capacity.
J. Abnorm. Psychol. 102, 474–481. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.102.3.474
Berg Schmidt, J., Johanneson Bertolt, C., Sjödin, A., Ackermann, F., Vibeke
Schmedes, A., Lynge Thomsen, H., et al. (2018). Does stress affect food
preferences? – a randomized controlled trial investigating the effect of
examination stress on measures of food preferences and obesogenic behavior.
Stress 21, 556–563. doi: 10.1080/10253890.2018.1494149
Bessa, J. M., Morais, M., Marques, F., Pinto, L., Palha, J. A., Almeida, O. F. X., et al.
(2013). Stress-induced anhedonia is associated with hypertrophy of medium
spiny neurons of the nucleus accumbens. Transl. Psychiatry 3, e266–e266. doi:
10.1038/tp.2013.39
Born, J. M., Lemmens, S. G. T., Rutters, F., Nieuwenhuizen, A. G., Formisano, E.,
Goebel, R., et al. (2010). Acute stress and food-related reward activation in the
brain during food choice during eating in the absence of hunger. Int. J. Obes.
34, 172–181. doi: 10.1038/ijo.2009.221
Brede, S., Sputh, A., Hartmann, A.-C., Hallschmid, M., Lehnert, H., and Klement,
J. (2017). Visual food cues decrease postprandial glucose concentrations in lean
and obese men without affecting food intake and related endocrine parameters.
Appetite 117, 255–262. doi: 10.1016/j.appet.2017.07.001
Bryce, C. A., and Floresco, S. B. (2016). Perturbations in effort-related
decision-making driven by acute stress and corticotropin-releasing factor.
Neuropsychopharmacology 41, 2147–2159. doi: 10.1038/npp.2016.15
Chen, Y., and Baram, T. Z. (2016). Toward understanding how early-
life stress reprograms cognitive and emotional brain networks.
Neuropsychopharmacology 41, 197–206. doi: 10.1038/npp.2015.181
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 July 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 724
fnins-13-00724 July 10, 2019 Time: 13:55 # 11
Ferreira et al. Cognition Impact in Stress Decision-Making
Christopoulos, G. I., Tobler, P. N., Bossaerts, P., Dolan, R. J., and Schultz,
W. (2009). Neural correlates of value. risk, and risk aversion contributing
to decision making under risk. J. Neurosci. 29, 12574–12583. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.2614-09.2009
Cohen, S., Kamarck, T., and Mermelstein, R. (1983). A global measure of perceived
stress. J. Health Soc. Behav. 24:385. doi: 10.2307/2136404
Delgado, M. R., Gillis, M. M., and Phelps, E. A. (2008). Regulating the expectation
of reward via cognitive strategies. Nat. Neurosci. 11, 880–881. doi: 10.1038/nn.
2141
Dias-Ferreira, E., Sousa, J. C., Melo, I., Morgado, P., Mesquita, A. R., Cerqueira,
J. J., et al. (2009). Chronic stress causes frontostriatal reorganization and affects
decision-making. Science 325, 621–625. doi: 10.1126/science.1171203
Fehr, E., and Camerer, C. F. (2007). Social neuroeconomics: the neural circuitry
of social preferences. Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 419–427. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.09.
002
Ferrer-Cascales, R., Albaladejo-Blázquez, N., Ruiz-Robledillo, N., Rubio-Aparicio,
M., Laguna-Pérez, A., and Zaragoza-Martí, A. (2018). Low adherence to the
mediterranean diet in isolated adolescents: the mediation effects of stress.
Nutrients 10:1894. doi: 10.3390/nu10121894
Figlewicz, D. P. (2015). Modulation of food reward by endocrine and
environmental factors. Psychosom. Med. 77, 664–670. doi: 10.1097/PSY.
0000000000000146
Gold, J. I., and Shadlen, M. N. (2007). The neural basis of decision making. Annu.
Rev. Neurosci. 30, 535–574. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.113038
Gorwood, P. (2008). Neurobiological mechanisms of anhedonia. Dialogues Clin.
Neurosci. 10, 291–299.
Hare, T. A., Camerer, C. F., and Rangel, A. (2009). Self-control in decision-making
involves modulation of the vmpfc valuation system. Science 324, 646–648.
doi: 10.1126/science.1168450
Hare, T. A., Malmaud, J., and Rangel, A. (2011). Focusing attention on the health
aspects of foods changes value signals in vmpfc and improves dietary choice.
J. Neurosci. 31, 11077–11087. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6383-10.2011
Hommer, R. E., Seo, D., Lacadie, C. M., Chaplin, T. M., Mayes, L. C., Sinha,
R., et al. (2013). Neural correlates of stress and favorite-food cue exposure in
adolescents: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Hum. BrainMapp.
34, 2561–2573. doi: 10.1002/hbm.22089
Hutcherson, C. A., Plassmann, H., Gross, J. J., and Rangel, A. (2012).
Cognitive regulation during decision making shifts behavioral control between
ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal value systems. J. Neurosci. 32, 13543–
13554. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6387-11.2012
Kirschbaum, C., Bono, E. G., Rohleder, N., Gessner, C., Pirke, K. M., Salvador,
A., et al. (1997). Effects of fasting and glucose load on free cortisol responses
to stress and nicotine. J. Clin. Endocrinol. Metab. 82, 1101–1105. doi: 10.1210/
jcem.82.4.3882
Kober, H., Mende-Siedlecki, P., Kross, E. F., Weber, J., Mischel, W., Hart, C. L., et al.
(2010). Prefrontal-striatal pathway underlies cognitive regulation of craving.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 14811–14816. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1007779107
Kroemer, N. B., Krebs, L., Kobiella, A., Grimm, O., Vollstädt-Klein, S.,
Wolfensteller, U., et al. (2013). (Still) longing for food: insulin reactivity
modulates response to food pictures. Hum. Brain Mapp. 34, 2367–2380. doi:
10.1002/hbm.22071
Louis, W. R., Chan, M. K.-H., and Greenbaum, S. (2009). Stress and the
theory of planned behavior: understanding healthy and unhealthy eating
intentions. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 39, 472–493. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2008.
00447.x
Magalhães, R., Barrière, D. A., Novais, A., Marques, F., Marques, P., Cerqueira,
J., et al. (2018). The dynamics of stress: a longitudinal MRI study of rat brain
structure and connectome. Mol. Psychiatry 23, 1998–2006. doi: 10.1038/mp.
2017.244
Maier, S. U., Makwana, A. B., and Hare, T. A. (2015). Acute stress impairs self-
control in goal-directed choice by altering multiple functional connections
within the brain’s decision circuits. Neuron 87, 621–631. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.
2015.07.005
May, J., Andrade, J., Kavanagh, D. J., and Hetherington, M. (2012). Elaborated
intrusion theory: a cognitive-emotional theory of food craving. Curr. Obes. Rep.
1, 114–121. doi: 10.1007/s13679-012-0010-12
Mcewen, B. S. (2004). Protection and damage from acute and chronic stress:
allostasis and allostatic overload and relevance to the pathophysiology of
psychiatric disorders. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1032, 1–7. doi: 10.1196/annals.1314.
001
McEwen, B. S., and Gianaros, P. J. (2011). Stress- and allostasis-induced brain
plasticity. Annu. Rev. Med. 62, 431–445. doi: 10.1146/annurev-med-052209-
100430
McGuire, J. T., and Kable, J. W. (2012). Decision makers calibrate behavioral
persistence on the basis of time-interval experience. Cognition 124, 216–226.
doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.008
Melcher, T., Obst, K., Mann, A., Paulus, C., and Gruber, O. (2012). Antagonistic
modulatory influences of negative affect on cognitive control: Reduced and
enhanced interference resolution capability after the induction of fear and
sadness. Acta Psychol. 139, 507–514. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2012.01.012
Minkley, N., and Kirchner, W. H. (2012). Influence of test tasks with different
cognitive demands on salivary cortisol concentrations in school students. Int.
J. Psychophysiol. 86, 245–250. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2012.09.015
Morgado, P., Freitas, D., Bessa, J. M., Sousa, N., and Cerqueira, J. J. (2013).
Perceived stress in obsessive–compulsive disorder is related with obsessive
but not compulsive symptoms. Front. Psychiatry 4:21. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2013.
00021
Morgado, P., Marques, F., Ribeiro, B., Leite-Almeida, H., Pêgo, J. M., Rodrigues,
A. J., et al. (2015a). Stress induced risk-aversion is reverted by D2/D3 agonist in
the rat. Eur. Neuropsychopharmacol. 25, 1744–1752. doi: 10.1016/j.euroneuro.
2015.07.003
Morgado, P., Sousa, N., and Cerqueira, J. J. (2015b). The impact of stress in
decision making in the context of uncertainty. J. Neurosci. Res. 93, 839–847.
doi: 10.1002/jnr.23521
Morgado, P., Silva, M., Sousa, N., and Cerqueira, J. J. (2012). Stress transiently
affects pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer. Front. Neurosci. 6:93. doi: 10.3389/
fnins.2012.00093
Neseliler, S., Tannenbaum, B., Zacchia, M., Larcher, K., Coulter, K., Lamarche, M.,
et al. (2017). Academic stress and personality interact to increase the neural
response to high-calorie food cues. Appetite 116, 306–314. doi: 10.1016/j.appet.
2017.05.016
Ochsner, K. N., Ray, R. D., Cooper, J. C., Robertson, E. R., Chopra, S., Gabrieli,
J. D. E., et al. (2004). For better or for worse: neural systems supporting
the cognitive down- and up-regulation of negative emotion. Neuroimage 23,
483–499. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2004.06.030
Papazacharias, A., Taurisano, P., Fazio, L., Gelao, B., Di Giorgio, A., Lo Bianco, L.,
et al. (2015). Aversive emotional interference impacts behavior and prefronto-
striatal activity during increasing attentional control. Front. Behav. Neurosci.
9:97. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00097
Phillips, M. L., Drevets, W. C., Rauch, S. L., and Lane, R. (2003). Neurobiology
of emotion perception II: implications for major psychiatric disorders. Biol.
Psychiatry 54, 515–528. doi: 10.1016/S0006-3223(03)00171-179
Pizzagalli, D. A., Bogdan, R., Ratner, K. G., and Jahn, A. L. (2007). Increased
perceived stress is associated with blunted hedonic capacity: Potential
implications for depression research. Behav. Res. Ther. 45, 2742–2753. doi:
10.1016/j.brat.2007.07.013
Plassmann, H., O’Doherty, J., and Rangel, A. (2007). Orbitofrontal cortex encodes
willingness to pay in everyday economic transactions. J. Neurosci. 27, 9984–
9988. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2131-07.2007
Platt, M. L., and Huettel, S. A. (2008). Risky business: the neuroeconomics of
decision making under uncertainty. Nat. Neurosci. 11, 398–403. doi: 10.1038/
nn2062
Porcelli, A. J., and Delgado, M. R. (2017). Stress and decision making: effects on
valuation, learning, and risk-taking. Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci. 14, 33–39. doi:
10.1016/j.cobeha.2016.11.015
Porcelli, A. J., Lewis, A. H., and Delgado, M. R. (2012). Acute stress influences
neural circuits of reward processing. Front. Neurosci. 6:157. doi: 10.3389/fnins.
2012.00157
Rangel, A., Camerer, C., and Montague, P. R. (2008). A framework for studying the
neurobiology of value-based decision making. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9, 545–556.
doi: 10.1038/nrn2357
Razzoli, M., Pearson, C., Crow, S., and Bartolomucci, A. (2017). Stress, overeating,
and obesity: insights from human studies and preclinical models. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. 76, 154–162. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.01.026
Sandi, C. (2013). Stress and cognition. Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Cogn. Sci. 4, 245–261.
doi: 10.1002/wcs.1222
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 11 July 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 724
fnins-13-00724 July 10, 2019 Time: 13:55 # 12
Ferreira et al. Cognition Impact in Stress Decision-Making
Schmid, D. A., Held, K., Ising, M., Uhr, M., Weikel, J. C., and Steiger, A. (2005).
Ghrelin stimulates appetite. imagination of food, gh, acth, and cortisol, but does
not affect leptin in normal controls. Neuropsychopharmacology 30, 1187–1192.
doi: 10.1038/sj.npp.1300670
Schüssler, P., Kluge, M., Yassouridis, A., Dresler, M., Uhr, M., and Steiger, A. (2012).
Ghrelin levels increase after pictures showing food. Obesity 20, 1212–1217.
doi: 10.1038/oby.2011.385
Soares, J. M., Sampaio, A., Ferreira, L. M., Santos, N. C., Marques, F., Palha, J. A.,
et al. (2012). Stress-induced changes in human decision-making are reversible.
Transl. Psychiatry 2, e131–e131. doi: 10.1038/tp.2012.59
Sousa, N. (2016). The dynamics of the stress neuromatrix. Mol. Psychiatry 21,
302–312. doi: 10.1038/mp.2015.196
Starcke, K., and Brand, M. (2012). Decision making under stress: A selective review.
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 36, 1228–1248. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.02.003
Stark, E. A., Parsons, C. E., Van Hartevelt, T. J., Charquero-Ballester, M.,
McManners, H., Ehlers, A., et al. (2015). Post-traumatic stress influences the
brain even in the absence of symptoms: a systematic, quantitative meta-analysis
of neuroimaging studies. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 56, 207–221. doi: 10.1016/j.
neubiorev.2015.07.007
Stojek, M. K., Fischer, S., and MacKillop, J. (2015). Stress, cues, and eating behavior.
Using drug addiction paradigms to understand motivation for food.Appetite 92,
252–260. doi: 10.1016/j.appet.2015.05.027
Tiedemann, L. J., Schmid, S. M., Hettel, J., Giesen, K., Francke, P., Büchel, C., et al.
(2017). Central insulin modulates food valuation via mesolimbic pathways. Nat.
Commun. 8:16052. doi: 10.1038/ncomms16052
Tryon, M. S., Carter, C. S., DeCant, R., and Laugero, K. D. (2013). Chronic
stress exposure may affect the brain’s response to high calorie food cues and
predispose to obesogenic eating habits. Physiol. Behav. 120, 233–242. doi: 10.
1016/j.physbeh.2013.08.010
Uy, J. P., and Galván, A. (2017). Acute stress increases risky decisions and dampens
prefrontal activation among adolescent boys. Neuroimage 146, 679–689. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.08.067
van Steenbergen, H., Band, G. P. H., and Hommel, B. (2011). Threat but not arousal
narrows attention: evidence from pupil dilation and saccade control. Front.
Psychol. 2:281. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00281
Wager, T. D., Davidson, M. L., Hughes, B. L., Lindquist, M. A., and Ochsner,
K. N. (2008). Prefrontal-subcortical pathways mediating successful emotion
regulation. Neuron 59, 1037–1050. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2008.09.006
Wemm, S. E., and Wulfert, E. (2017). Effects of acute stress on decision making.
Appl. Psychophysiol. Biofeedback 42, 1–12. doi: 10.1007/s10484-016-9347-9348
Wierenga, C. E., Lavender, J. M., and Hays, C. C. (2018). The potential of calibrated
fMRI in the understanding of stress in eating disorders. Neurobiol. Stress 9,
64–73. doi: 10.1016/j.ynstr.2018.08.006
Yu, R. (2016). Stress potentiates decision biases: A stress induced deliberation-to-
intuition (SIDI) model. Neurobiol. Stress 3, 83–95. doi: 10.1016/j.ynstr.2015.12.
006
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2019 Ferreira, Veiga, Moreira, Magalhães, Coelho, Marques, Portugal-
Nunes, Sousa and Morgado. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution
or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and
the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 12 July 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 724
